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Farm subsidies and agricultural employment:  
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Abstract 
Agricultural  employment  in  industrialized  countries  has  been  steadily  decreasing  despite 
important levels of farm subsidies. We argue that one explanation to this puzzle is the positive 
impact  of  subsidies  on  the  education  levels  of  farmers’  children.  If  farmers  are  credit 
constrained,  they  may  underinvest  in  their  children’s  education.  By  increasing  farmers’ 
revenues, subsidies increase investment in education. If more educated children are less willing 
to become farmers, one long term effect of subsidies is to reduce labor supply in the agricultural 
sector. We provide a theoretical model and some empirical evidence supporting this argument. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The past century has witnessed a major decline in western countries’ workforce employed 
in the agricultural sector. A hundred years ago, almost one out of two persons in North America 
and Western Europe was employed in agriculture. In 2008, the share of agricultural employment 
was 3.4% in the EU15 and 1.5% in the US (Table 1).
1 This decline accelerated in the past 
decades. Between 1971 and 2009, agricultural employment in the EU15 decreased by 45% to 
85%. In Spain for example, the share of agricultural employment dropped from 30% in 1971 to 
4% in 2009 (Figure 1).  
 
Table 1: Share of agricultural employment  
Country  Share of Agricultural Employment in 
1970 
Share of Agricultural Employment in 
2008 
Australia  8.0%  3.3% 
Canada  3.3%  2.4% 
EU-15  13.4%*  3.4% 
Iceland  n.a.  4.8% 
Japan  17.4%  4.2% 
New Zealand  10.6% (1986)  6.9% 
Norway  12.2% (1972)  2.8% 
South Korea  50.4%  7.2% 
Switzerland  8.6%  4.0% 
United States  4.5%  1.5% 
Source: Eurostat, ILO, national statistics; * estimate 
                                                       
 
 
1 Timmer (2009) describes the fast structural change in the agricultural sector of the rich economies and how it is propelling their 
economies to “ A World Without Agriculture”. He arguments that this process is occurring fast and illustrates this by the following 
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Agricultural activities in the EU15 are traditionally concentrated in family farms, which 
are usually transmitted from generation to generation.
2 The decline in agricultural employment 
is largely due to the fact that farmers’ children in these countries have been turning more and 
more to industry or services rather than taking over their parents’ farm (Calus et al., 2008). For 
example,  in  2008,  only  27%  of  all  Dutch  farmers  older  than  50  indicated  that  they  had  a 
successor and in the Belgian Flanders region, this percentage was even lower (13%) (De Bont 
and Van Everdingen, 2010; Vlaamse Overheid, 2009). 
This  decline  in  agricultural  employment  is  taking  place  despite  the  fact  that  rich 
economies have introduced considerable farm income support. In the period 2003-2008, the US 
government spent between USD 12 billion and USD 20 billion per year for supporting farmers 
(USDA Economic Research Service). In the period 2005-2010, The EU spent more than 50 
billion euros per year for supporting farmers through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). If 
one takes into account support through market regulations, European support to farmers in 2009 
was around 87 billion euros (OECD, 2010). 
Given  the  size  of  the  income  support  directed  to  farmers,  the  speed  of  decline  in 
agricultural employment is puzzling. Intuitively, one would expect subsidies to have a positive 
impact on agricultural employment. However, empirical evidence suggests that the opposite is 
happening. The outflow of labor from the agricultural sector has been strongest in the countries 
                                                       
 
 
2 In 2007, 83% of the EU-15 agricultural labor force was concentrated in family farms and in some countries, such as Ireland (99%), 
Spain (99%) and Italy (96%) virtually all agricultural employment was in family farms. For a detailed overview of the reasons for 
the dominance of intergenerational farm succession, see Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000).  Ancona - 122
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which have supported agriculture most heavily. A quick look at OECD data over the period 
1987–2007 shows that changes in agricultural income support, captured by producer support 
estimate (PSE) indicator were negatively correlated with changes in agricultural employment 
(Figure 2). A similar pattern can be observed at the sub-sector level within agriculture. The most 
heavily subsidized sub-sectors had the strongest employment decline (Figure 3 and 4).  
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Figure 3: Average share in total market price support (MPS) in different subsectors in the 
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Note that the data presented in Figure 4 is for Belgium, since no data is available on the EU 15 for this time period. 
However, for most of the EU 15 countries where we have data on, we find similar results. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat 
 
A  number  of  academic  papers  have  analyzed  the  impact  of  subsidies  on  agricultural 
employment. Depending on their conclusions, they can be classified in three groups. 
A first group of studies found no effect of subsidies on agricultural employment. Barkley 
(1990) reaches this conclusion using aggregate data on price support programs and agricultural 
employment  in  the  US  for  the  period  1940-1985.  He  argues  that  two  opposite  effects  of 
subsidies offset each other. On the one hand, price support programs raise labor supply in 
agriculture, since they increase income from farming. On the other hand, price support programs 
reduce labor demand in agriculture, since they are usually coupled with obligations to set aside 
part of the land. Mishra et al. (2004) find similar results for the US. Glauben, Tietje and Weiss 
(2006) find that subsidies had no impact on agricultural employment in Western Germany.  
A  second  group  of  studies  found  a  positive  impact  of  subsidies  on  agricultural 
employment. Foltz (2004) shows that US dairy price policies reduced the rate of farm exit in the 
dairy sector in Connecticut, in the period 1997-2001. Key and Roberts (2006) find that larger 
government payments, in the form of more base acres, had a small but statistically significant 
effect  in  facilitating  US  cash  grain  farm  survival  in  the  period  1982-1997.  Breustedt  and 
Glauben (2007) find that increases in subsidy payments and output prices significantly reduced 
the decline in the number of farms in the period 1993-1997 in 110 regions of the EU15. Pietola 
et al. (2003) find that policies which lowered output prices, such as subsidy cuts, accelerated the 
decline in farm population in Finland. 
A third group of studies found a negative impact of subsidies on agricultural employment. 
Goetz  and  Debertin  (1996)  show  that  farm  program  payments  accelerate  capital-labor Ancona - 122
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substitution and are associated with higher migration out of agriculture. Goetz and Debertin 
(2001) use US county level data for the period 1980-1990 to show that government payments 
reduce the odds that the number of farm operators is decreasing in a county, but when this 
number is decreasing, payments increase the speed of decline. They argue that government 
payments may help farmers maintain their activity, but they may also help them buy out the 
farms of those seeking to exit, which accelerates the decline in the number of farmers. Hoppe 
and Korbi (2006) use individual farm level data for the period 1978-1997 to show that exit rates 
for farmers producing grain are generally higher than for those producing beef cattle. They 
relate this finding to the fact that grain farms receive more government assistance than beef 
cattle farms and argue that government programs speed the exit rate of small grain farms by 
providing funds for larger farms to buy them out. Based on regional Eastern German data, 
Petrick and Zier (2010) found that both coupled and decoupled direct payments had a negative 
impact on agricultural employment. In addition, they find a zero marginal effect of investment 
aid and transfers to less favored areas on agricultural employment, while agri-environmental 
measures had a positive effect on agricultural labor.  
This conflicting evidence suggests that the impact farm support programs on agricultural 
employment is not straightforward. Several channels with opposite effects come into play and 
the total effect varies among regions and time periods. We believe that one important channel 
through which subsidies affect agricultural employment in the long run has been overlooked by 
the literature. This channel is the effect of subsidies on the education level of farmers’ children. 
When farmers are credit constrained, they may underinvest in their children’s education. 
By increasing farmers’ revenues, subsidies allow them to increase investment in education. If 
children with higher education levels are less willing to work in the agricultural sector then one 
long term effect of farm subsidies is to reduce labor supply in the agricultural sector. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to analysis of the impact of farm subsidies on 
agricultural employment by focusing on the education channel. We provide a theoretical model 
and some empirical evidence supporting our argument.  
Our  theoretical  framework  is  a  two  period  model  of  intergenerational  investment  in 
education, based on Acemoglu and Pischke (2001). The economy is composed of farmers with 
heterogeneous  revenues  exogenously  given.  In  period  one,  each  farmer  decides  whether  to 
consume all his revenue or to invest part of it in his child’s education. In period two, each child 
decides whether to work in the agricultural sector or in the non-agricultural sector (industrial or 
service sector), depending on the expected revenue in each sector. We assume that education 
increases expected revenues and that returns to education are higher in the non-agricultural 
sector. We show that in presence of credit constraints, subsidies have two opposite effects on 
agricultural employment. On one hand, for given education levels, they induce more children to 
choose the agricultural sector, since they increase agricultural revenues with respect to non-
agricultural sector revenues. On the other hand, subsidies allow more farmers to educate their 
children, increasing the attractiveness of jobs in the non-agricultural sector for those children. Ancona - 122
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The overall effect of subsidies depends on farmers’ revenue distribution. When the proportion 
of poor farmers is sufficiently high, subsidies reduce agricultural labor supply in the long term. 
We provide some empirical support for this argument using data on farming households’ 
revenues  and  their  children’s  education  levels  and  employment  sectors  in  five  European 
countries. In absence of data on the level subsidies received by each farmer, we assume that 
subsidies increase farmers’ revenues by some factor and we estimate the effect of farmers’ 
revenues on  their  children’s  schooling  level  and  employment  sector. We find  that  farmer’s 
revenue has a positive and significant impact on the number of years of schooling of his child, 
which in turn has a negative and significant impact on the probability that the child will work in 
the agricultural sector. This evidence suggests that farm subsidies accelerated the decline in 
agricultural employment in the countries considered.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the theoretical 
model.  In  section  3  we  present  the  data,  the  estimation  methods  and  the  empirical  results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2.  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We build a model of investment in schooling based on Acemoglu and Pischke (2001). 
The economy is composed of   farmers with revenues  , following a cumulative distribution 
function   Each farmer has one child. The game lasts two periods.  
In period 1, each farmer consumes  , saves   and invest an amount   to educate his child. 
He dies at the end of the period. 
In period 2, the child’s education level is   if parents invested in his education and 
 otherwise.
3 Each child decides whether to work in the agricultural sector, i.e. overtake 
his parents’ farm, or work in the non-agricultural sector, i.e. take a job in the industrial or 
services sectors. Child’s expected revenue is denoted   and his consumption level is denoted 
. The game ends at the end of period 2.  
The farmer is altruistic towards his child. His utility function depends on his consumption 
level and on his child’s consumption level: 
,                (1) 
where   is the altruism rate. 
Each farmer maximizes his utility with respect to his consumption level  , the amount of 
savings   and his child’s education level  , subject to his budget constraint and to his child’s 
budget constraint.  
                                                       
 
 
3 For simplicity we assume the level of education to be a binary variable.  Ancona - 122
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Assuming for simplicity that the interest rate is zero
4, the farmers’ and his child’s budget 
constraints are respectively given by: 
                (2) 
                  (3) 
The child’s utility only depends on his consumption level. Therefore the child chooses the 
employment sector that allows him to earn the highest expected revenue.
5 
We assume that children without education earn the same revenue as their parents,  , if 
they choose to overtake their parents’ farm.  If they choose to work in the non-agricultural 
sector, they earn an expected revenue of  .  
Education increases productivity and revenues. We assume that educated children earn 
 if they choose to work in the agricultural sector and   if they choose 
to work in the non-agricultural sector, where   and   are the rates of return to education in 
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors respectively. 
We assume that: 
,                  (4) 
i.e. the returns to education are lower in the agricultural sector.
6  
We assume that education is a pure investment good, i.e. it has no other value than 
increasing expected revenues. 
Agricultural employment in period one is exogenously given by the number of farmers, 
. Agricultural employment in period two is endogenously given by the number of farmers’ 
children who choose to work in the agricultural sector.
7 We denote it  . 
Our aim is to assess the impact of farm subsidies on agricultural employment in period 
two.  We  solve  the  model  by  backward  induction.  First,  we  determine  child’s  employment 
choice for a given education level. Second, we determine parents’ education decisions. Finally, 
we compute agricultural employment in period two and we analyze the effect of subsidies on 
this variable.  
Uneducated children choose to work in the agricultural sector if  . Educated 
children  choose  to  work  in  the  agricultural  sector  if  . 
Assumption  (4)  implies  that  all  else  equal,  educated  children  are  less  likely  to  choose  the 
agricultural sector.
8 
                                                       
 
 
4 Introducing a positive interest rate would not alter the results. 
5 Other factors than revenue may affect the employment decisions of farmers’ children. They may take into account leisure time and 
the probability of being unemployed in each sector and they may derive additional utility from overtaking their parents’ activity. We 
assume that the monetary values of these other factors are included in the expected revenues of each sector. 
6 Based on a sample of high school graduates in the US, Orazam and Matilla (1991) have shown the returns to schooling are higher 
for non-agricultural occupations than for agricultural employment. 
7 We assume that individuals can only enter the agricultural sector by taking over the farm of their parents.  
8 Ceteris paribus, the minimum farm revenue inducing a child to choose the agricultural sector is higher when the child is educated: 
/ . Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 8 of 21 
We can classify farmers’ children into three groups, depending on their parents’ revenue. 
First, children of farmers with revenues   such that   choose the non-agricultural 
sector independently of their education level. Second, children of farmers with revenues   
such that    choose  the  agricultural  sector independently  of 
their  education  level.  Finally,  children  of  farmers  with  revenues    such  that 
 choose the agricultural sector if and only if they are 
not educated. Therefore, the educational choices of these intermediate revenue farmers affect 
agricultural employment in period two. 
Since the focus of this paper is the impact of farmers’ educational choices on agricultural 
employment, we restrict our attention to these intermediate revenue farmers, i.e. we assume that 
the  revenue  of  all  farmers  is  higher  than  the  expected  revenue  in  other  sectors  for  a  non-
educated person, but lower than the expected revenue in other sectors for an educated person
9: 
           (5) 
Assumption (5) implies that a child will overtake his parents’ farm if and only if he is not 
educated. Then, the child’s expected revenue can be written as: 
.            (6) 
Each farmer maximizes (1) subject to (2), (3) and (6). We solve parents’ optimization 
problem in two cases. First, we consider the benchmark case in which farmers are not credit 
constrained, i.e. they can borrow pledging the future income of their child. Second, we consider 
the more realistic case in which farmers are credit constrained, i.e. they cannot borrow pledging 
the future income of their child. 
2.1. Benchmark case: absence of credit constraints 
In this section we suppose that farmers can borrow money in period one, pledging on 
their child’s income in period two. Thus, savings can be negative. 
After solving parents’ optimization problem, we obtain that parents invest in education if 
and only if: 
              (7) 
The right hand side of (7) is the cost of education. The left hand side of (7) is the benefit 
of education. As only non-educated children will choose farming, this benefit is equal to the 
difference  between  the  expected  revenue  outside  agriculture  for  an  educated  child  and  the 
farming revenue for a non-educated child. In absence of credit constraints, farmers invest in 
education if and only if the benefit of education exceeds its cost. 
Note  that  the  cost  of  education,  ,  is  the  same  for  everyone,  while  the  benefit  of 
education,  is higher for poorer farmers. Therefore, in absence of credit 
                                                       
 
 
9 This assumption reduces the number of cases to be considered and simplifies the reasoning, but it is not driving our results. Similar 
conclusions can be reached without restricting farming revenues.  Ancona - 122
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constraints,  only  the  relatively  poor  farmers,  i.e.  those  with  revenues 
, invest in education. 
The  proportion  of  educated  children  in  period  two  is  then  equal  to 
 and agricultural employment in period two is given by: 
.            (8) 
Let’s now analyze the effect of farming subsidies on  .  
Suppose  that  subsidies  increase  farming  revenues  in  both  periods,  from    to 
, with  . Let   denote agricultural employment in period two as a function 
of subsidies. 
Children  of  farmers  with  revenues    such  that 
 will choose the agricultural sector independently 
of their education level. The proportion of farmers in this interval whose child will take over the 
farm is thus equal to 1, while it was   in absence of subsidies.  
Children  of  farmers  with  revenues    such  that 
 will choose the agricultural sector if and only if 
they  are  not  educated.  These  farmers  invest  in  education  if 
.
10 The proportion of farmers in this revenue range whose 
child  will take  over  the  farm  is  thus  equal to  .
11  In 
absence  of  subsidies,  this  proportion  was  lower.  Indeed,  as    is  a  cumulative  distribution 
function,  .  
Thus, we can state: 
Result 1 In absence of credit constraints, subsidies have a positive impact on agricultural 
employment in the next generation. 
Note  that  if  subsidies  are  sufficiently  high,  all  farmers’  revenues  satisfy 
 and all children will choose to become farmers. 
Given assumption (5), a sufficient condition for this to happen is: 
.             (9) 
Let us now consider the more realistic case of credit constrained farmers.  
2.2. Realistic case: presence of credit constraints 
In this section we suppose that farmers cannot borrow money in period one, pledging on 
their child’s income in period two. Thus, savings cannot be negative. 
Then parents maximize (1) under (2), (3), (6) and the positive savings constraint: 
                    (10) 
 
                                                       
 
 
10The solution to the maximization problem of these farmers is obtained by replacing   with   in the initial problem. 
11 This is the proportion of farmers who do not invest in education. Ancona - 122
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Solving this optimization problem, we obtain that parents invest in education if: 
        (11) 
The probability that a farmer invests in his child’s education, i.e. the probability that (11) 
is satisfied, decreases with the cost of education,  , and increases with the non-agricultural 
skilled  wage,  .  The  impact  of  farmer’s  revenue  on  this  probability  is  not 
straightforward. One can check that   is increasing in   for   and decreasing 
in   for  , where  . This means that increasing poor farmers’ 
revenues has a positive impact on investment in education, while the opposite is true for rich 
farmers. 
The relationship between farming revenue and investment in education is non-monotonic 
because revenue has two opposite effects on farmers’ educational choices. On the one hand, as 
farming revenue increases, the benefit of education decreases, so investment in education should 
decrease. On the other hand, as revenue increases, credit constraints become less binding, so 
investment in education should increase. The positive effect of revenue is dominant as long as 
. 
Let   and   be the solutions to  , with  . Farmers with revenues 
 such that   do not invest in education because they are credit constrained, and 
farmers with revenues   such that   do not invest in education because the returns are 
not  sufficiently  high.  Farmers  with  revenues    invest  in  education.  Then 
agricultural employment in period two is equal to: 
.         (12) 
Let’s now analyze the effect of subsidies on  . As in the previous section, suppose that 
subsidies increase all farming revenues from   to  .  
Children  of  farmers  with  revenues    such  that 
 will choose the agricultural sector independently 
of their education level. The proportion of farmers in this revenue range whose children will 
work in agriculture is 1. Thus subsidies increase the proportion of successors for farmers in this 
revenue range. 
Children of farmers with revenues   such   
will choose the agricultural sector if and only if they are not educated. These farmers invest in 
education if  . The proportion of farmers in this revenue range 
whose children work in agriculture is  , while it 
was   in absence of subsidies. Subsidies increase the proportion of 
successors for farmers in this revenue range if and only if: 
      (13) Ancona - 122
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The  right  hand  side  of  (13)  is  the  proportion  of  farmers  who  are  able  to  invest  in 
education thanks to subsidies. The left hand side of (13) is the proportion of farmers who are not 
willing to invest in education because of subsidies.  
These different farmers are represented in Figure 5. If the proportion of farmers with 
revenues  between    and    is  sufficiently  high,  i.e.  if 
, then subsidies have a negative 
impact on agricultural employment in period two. 
As in the previous section, if   is sufficiently high, all children will become farmers, i.e. 
sufficiently high subsidies increase agricultural employment. 
 
Figure 5: Farmers’ revenues and succession 
 
 
Hence, we can state: 
Result 2 In presence of credit constraints, subsidies may have a positive, a nil or a 
negative effect on agricultural employment in the next generation. A negative effect is more 
likely when subsidies are not too high and when the proportion of poor farmers is important. 
Our theoretical framework shows that credit constrained farmers under invest in their 
children’s  education.  An  increase  in  their  revenues  through  subsidies  would  increase  the 
education  levels  of  their  children,  accelerating  migration  out  of  agriculture  in  the  next 
generation. The following section provides some empirical evidence supporting this argument. Ancona - 122
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3.  EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK 
3.1. Data 
We use data from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). This is a survey 
based  on a  standardised  questionnaire  that involves  annual  interviewing  of  a representative 
panel of households and individuals in each country, covering a wide range of topics. The total 
duration of the ECHP was 8 years (waves), running from 1994 to 2001.  
The sampling scheme of the panel allows identifying identical individuals and households 
in each year. We can thus identify children and their parents in two different waves of the 
ECHP.  
From the first wave, collected in 1994, we selected households in which at least one of 
the  parents  was  self-employed  in  the  agricultural  sector.  We  only  consider  self-employed 
farmers because most of the farms in the EU-15 are family farms and succession takes place 
within the household (Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000). We included information on household 
characteristics, parents’ income and education level.  
From the sixth wave, collected in 1999, we selected the children of households which 
were in the education system in 1994 and finished their studies.
12 We gathered information on 
their  current  employment  sector,  their  highest  level  of  education  and  some  personal 
characteristics.  
Our dataset contains 97 individuals from Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland. For the other 
EU-15 countries, we were not able to identify a sufficient number of individuals self-employed 
in agriculture. 
Unfortunately, the dataset does not include any information on the level of agricultural 
subsidies received by each farmer. Our approach is to assume that subsidies increase farming 
revenue  by  a  given  factor  and  to  estimate  the  marginal  impact  of  farming  revenue  on  the 
education level and employment sector of farmers’ children.  
3.2. Empirical Specification and Variables 
In order to assess the marginal impact of farming revenue on the education level and 
employment  sector  of  farmers’  children,  we  estimate  an  econometrical  model  in  which  we 
assume the educational and occupational decisions to be jointly determined.
13  We estimate the 
following model:   
LEAVEi = α0 + α1 SCHOOLi+ α2 SELFi + α3 WAGEi + α4 GENDERi +α5 HHSIZEi +  
α6 AGSIBLINGi + α7 SCHOOLPARi + country dummies + εi    
SCHOOLi = β0 + β1 LEAVEi +β2 SELFi + β3 WAGEi + β4 GENDERi + β5 HHSIZEi + β6 
AGSIBLINGi + β7 SCHOOLPARi +β8 ALLOWANCEi + country dummies +  i       (15) 
                                                       
 
 
12 The choice of using data from the first and the sixth wave was purely arbitrary.  
13 This approach is similar to Hennessey and Rehman (2007). Ancona - 122
nd EAAE Seminar 
"Evidence-Based Agricultural and Rural Policy Making” 
Page 13 of 21 
LEAVE is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the child is not employed in 
the agricultural sector in 1999, and zero otherwise. Since the returns to schooling are expected 
to  be  higher  outside  the  agricultural  sector,  individuals  who  already  decided  to  leave  the 
agricultural sector are expected to take up more education compared to those that decided to 
stay in agriculture and hence it is expected that LEAVE has a positive impact on the level of 
schooling of the child.  
SCHOOL is the natural logarithm of the number of years of full time education of the 
child in 1999. We expected SCHOOL to have a positive impact on the probability to leave 
agriculture as the returns to schooling in non-agricultural employment are higher compared to 
agricultural employment.  
SELF is the natural logarithm of self-employed farming income of the parents in 1994 
(PPP adjusted, in euros).
14 We expect this variable to have a negative impact on the decision to 
leave  agriculture,  once  education  is  controlled  for,  since  it  is  a  proxy  for  child’s  expected 
income in the agricultural sector. However, we expect a positive impact of SELF on the level of 
schooling of the child as a higher income reduces credit constraints of the parents which allows 
them to invest (more) in the education of their children.   
WAGE is dummy variable which takes the value of one if the main source of income for 
the parents comes from an employment different from farming in 1994, and zero otherwise. 
Parents with an off farm employment experience acquire additional skills/information/networks 
to those useful in farming. If these assets are transmitted to children, the latter will be more 
likely  to  find  an  off  farm  employment  themselves  (Hennessey  and  Rehman,  2007).  Being 
employed  in  another  sector  may  also  encourage  parents  to  invest  in  the  schooling  of  their 
children as they have a positive attitude towards working in off farm employment and they want 
to encourage their children to also take up employment in the non-agricultural sector. Therefore 
we expect that WAGE has a positive impact on the level of education of the child. 
GENDER is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the child is a woman, and zero 
if  the  child  is  a  man.  Some  studies  found  that  the  probability  of  succession  is  negatively 
correlated  to  the  number  of  daughters.
15  We  expect a  positive  impact  of  GENDER  on  the 
decision to leave agriculture. According to Eurostat data on female enrolment in education, 
women are more likely to engage in higher education and therefore we expect a positive effect 
of GENDER on the level of education of the child.  
HHSIZE is the household size of the family in the first wave, measured by the number of 
adult  equivalents  according  to  the  OECD  equalized  scale.
16  We  expect  HHSIZE  to  have 
positive impact on the decision to leave agriculture, since in larger household the probability 
that another family member will take over the farm is higher. The effect of HHSIZE on the level 
                                                       
 
 
14 We also include the squared term of self-employed income in the regression, but we did not find evidence of a non-linear impact, 
which could be related to the nature of the sample. 
15 See for example Glauben et al (2004, 2010). 
16 The household size is equal to 1 + 0.7*(number of adults in the household of 14 years or more -1) + 0.5*(number of children in 
the household younger than 14 years). Ancona - 122
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of schooling of the child is not straightforward. On the one hand, one may expect that in case 
that there are multiple children, there is less money per child available to invest in the child’s 
education and hence there may be a negative impact of HHSIZE on the level of education of the 
child. On the other hand in larger households the older children may contribute to the education 
of the younger children. In this case this effect dominates, HHSIZE has a positive impact on the 
level of education of the child.  
AGSIBLING is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the child has a sibling 
which  is  also  employed  in  the  agricultural  sector,  and  zero  otherwise.  The  effect  of 
AGSIBLING on the decision to leave the agricultural sector can be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, one might expect that when the child has a sibling working on the farm, he is less likely to 
also  start  working  on  the  farm  as  there  is  maybe  not  enough  work  on  the  farm  for  two. 
However,  on  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that sibling  is  working  on  the  farm,  is maybe  be  an 
indication that agricultural work is profitable and it could a stimulus for the child to also start 
working on the farm.  
SCHOOLPAR is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if one of the parents has 
completed  secondary  education.  As  more  educated  farmers  are  more  likely  to  adopt  new 
technologies and more modern and efficient farms may be more attractive for farmers’ heir, we 
expect  SCHOOLPAR  to  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  probability  that  children  leave 
agriculture, in line with other studies on this question.
17 In addition, we expect SCHOOLPAR to 
have a positive impact on the level of schooling of the child.  
In  order  to  eliminate  the  simultaneity  bias  due  to  the  fact  that  educational  and 
occupational  decisions  are  jointly  determined  ,  we  will  estimate  the  model  using  an  IV 
procedure.  We  instrument  the  variable  SCHOOL  with  the  level  of  education  allowances 
received by the parents. Education allowances are expected to have a positive impact on the 
level  of  schooling  of  children
18,  and  there  is  no  obvious  reason  why  they  should  affect 
children’s  employment  decisions  other  than  through  education.  The  instrumental  variable 
ALLOWANCE is the natural logarithm of the education allowance received by the parents 
(PPP-adjusted, in euros), to which we added one euro to ensure that it takes the value zero for 
households that do not receive education allowance. 
Country dummies control for country fixed effects.  






                                                       
 
 
17 See for example Mishra et al., 2004; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; Glauben et al., 2004. 
18 An indicator for a good instrument is that the correlation between the instrument and the variable for which one instruments is 
high. This holds in our case and the correlation between  SCHOOL and ALLOWANCE is high, namely 19%.  Ancona - 122
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 








Leave   Dummy variable that takes a value zero if the child is employed 
in agriculture and one otherwise (Wave 6) 
0  1 
SCHOOL  Natural logarithm of the number of years that the child has been 
in full time education (Wave 6) 
2.21  2.48 
     
Household income variables     
SELF  Natural logarithm of the income from self-employed farming of 
the parents (in euro and controlled for PPP) (Wave 1) 
7.97  7.90 
WAGE  Dummy variable which takes a value of one if the main source of 
household income of the parents comes from wages and salaries 
and zero otherwise (Wave 1) 
0.16  0.28 
       
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics (continued) 






Household and personal characteristics variables     
HIGH  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the child has a 
higher education (equal or higher than the secondary level 
education) and zero otherwise (Wave 6) 
0.37  0.71 
GENDER  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if the child is a woman 
and zero when the child is a man (Wave 6) 
0.32  0.42 
HHSIZE  Household size of the family in the first wave and is measured as 
the number of adult equivalents according to the OECD 
equalized scale (Wave 1) 
4.00  4.27 
AGSIBLING  Dummy variable that takes a value of one when the child has a 
sibling working in agriculture and zero otherwise (Wave 6) 
0.89  0.77 
SCHOOLPAR  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if one of the parents 
emploed in agriculture has a higher education (equal or higher 
than the secondary level education) and zero otherwise (Wave 1) 
0.26  0.08 
       
Country dummies 
IRELAND  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if parents and child 
live in Ireland and zero otherwise 
0.21  0.26 
ITALY  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if parents and child 
live in Italy and zero otherwise 
0.26  0.37 
SPAIN  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if parents and child 
live in Spain and zero otherwise 
0.11  0.10 
PORTUGAL  Dummy variable that takes a value of one if parents and child 
live in Portugal and zero otherwise 
0.42  0.27 
 
 
                                                       
 
 
19 In 1999, 80% of the children were employed in the non-agricultural sector, while 20% of the children was employed in the 
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3.3. Results 
Table 3 gives the estimation results for the estimation model.  
In  the  first  stage  regression,  ALLOWANCE  is  positively  correlated  with  children’s 
schooling at the 1% level, which is an indication that the instrument is valid. SELF has a 
positive  and  significant  effect  on  children’s  schooling,  which  indicates  that  an  increase  in 
farming will lead to a higher level of schooling of the child. This suggests that subsidies may 
play an important role in overcoming farmers credit constraints such that they are able to invest 
(more)  in  their  children’s education.  AGSIBLING  has  a positive  and  significant  impact  on 
children’s  schooling.  This  suggests  that  when  already  one  of  the  children  is  working  in 
agriculture the parents may decide to invest in the schooling of the other children because there 
may be not sufficient work for both children on the farm.  
In  the  second  stage  regression,  we  find  that  children’s  schooling  has  a  positive  and 
significant effect on the probability to leave the agricultural sector. Evaluated at the mean level 
of schooling, a 10% increase in schooling increases the probability of leaving agriculture by 
22%.  
Once  education  is  controlled  for,  parents’  farming  income  has  a  negative  impact  on 
children’s decision to leave agriculture, as expected from the theoretical model. Evaluated at the 
mean self-employed farming income, a 10% increase in farming income decreases children’s 
probability of leaving agriculture by 1.5%.  
AGSIBLING has a negative and significant impact on the probability to leave agriculture, 
indicating that when of his siblings is working in agriculture the child will be less likely to leave 
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Table  3:  Determinants  of  the  decision  to  leave  the  agricultural  sector  for  farmers’ 
children, controlling for simultaneity bias; log likelihood estimations. 





  Coefficient  z-value  Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient  z-value 
Household income           
SELF  -0.221**  -2.28  -0.087  0.066**  2.40 
WAGE  -0.400  -1.57  -0.158  0.130*  1.70 
ALLOWANCE  -  -  -  0.030***  3.78 
           
Household and personal 
characteristics 
         
SCHOOL  3.416***  12.36  1.342  -  - 
GENDER  0.094  0.48  0.037  -0.013  -0.22 
HHSIZE  0.090  1.13  0.035  -0.029  -1.27 
AGSIBLING  -0.669*  -1.96  -0.245  0.189*  1.80 
SCHOOLPAR  0.060  0.16  0.023  -0.046  -0.40 
           
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -5.578***  -5.84  -  1.642***  6.76- 
          Log likelihood    -54.61 
Wald test  195.57 (0.00) 
- 
Wald test for exogeneity  390.18 (0.00) 
Correctly classified observations  72.16% 
Observations  97 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1%. We reported robust standard errors.  
 
These findings support the theoretical analysis of section 2. Increases in farming revenues 
are  partly  used  for  investing  in  the  education  of  farmers’  children  and  they  decrease  the 
probability that those children will become farmers. 
3.4. Robustness Checks 
In this section we perform two types of robustness checks.  
First, we estimate equation (16) using two stage least squares instead of instrumental 
probit. This estimation method requires less distributional assumptions, but ignores the binary 
nature of the dependent variable. The estimation results are presented in Table 5. They confirm 
the positive effect of farming income on schooling and the positive impact of schooling on the 
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Table  4:  Determinants  of  the  decision  to  leave  the  agricultural  sector  for  farmers’ 
children, controlling for simultaneity bias, OLS estimations. 
  Second Stage 
(Outcome variable=Leave) 
First Stage 
(Outcome variable: SCHOOL) 
  Coefficient  z-value  Coefficient  z-value 
Household income         
SELF  -0.066  -1.52  0.066**  2.27 
WAGE  -0.034  -0.30  0.130  1.60 
ALLOWANCE  -  -  0.030***  3.58 
         
Household and personal 
characteristics 
       
SCHOOL  1.147**  2.55  -  - 
GENDER  0.129  1.58  -0.013  -0.20 
HHSIZE  0.017  0.52  -0.029  -1.20 
AGSIBLING  -0.249  -1.45  0.189*  1.71 
SCHOOLPAR  -0.310**  -2.10  -0.046  -0.37 
         
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant  -1.248  -1.47  1.642***  6.39 
     
Observations   97  97 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1% 
 
We reported robust standard errors. 
Second, we estimate equation (16) using a different measure for children’s education 
level. Instead of the number of years of schooling, we use the dummy variable HIGH, which 
takes the value one if the child completed secondary education:  
 
LEAVEi = α0 + α1 HIGHi+ α2 SELFi + α3 WAGEi + α4 GENDERi +α5 HHSIZEi + 
α6 AGSIBLINGi + α7 SCHOOLPARi + country dummies + εi 
 
HIGHi = β0 + β1 LEAVEi + β2 SELFi + β3WAGEi + β4 GENDERi + β5HHSIZEi + 
β6 AGSIBLINGi +β7 SCHOOLPARi + β8ALLOWANCEi + country dummies + µ         (17) 
 
We estimate (17) with a recursive simultaneous bivariate probit model. This estimation 
method takes into account the possibility that educational and occupational choices are made 
jointly, as predicted in the theoretical framework. 
The estimation results, given in Table 6, confirm our earlier findings. Farmers’ income 
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education.  Having  completed  secondary  education  (or  higher)  significantly  increases  the 
probability of leaving the agricultural sector. A 10% increase in parents’ farming income is 
associated with 1.5% increase in the probability of completing secondary education for the 
child. Completing secondary education increases the probability to leave agriculture by 85%.  
Thus, the children of richer farmers have higher education levels and are then more likely 
to work in a different sector than agriculture. Under the assumption that subsidies increase 
farmers’  income,  we  expect  subsidies  to  have  accelerated  exit  out  of  agriculture  in  these 
countries.  
 
Table  5:  Determinants  of  the  decision  to  leave  the  agricultural  sector  for  farmers’ 
children, dummy variable for schooling, controlling for simultaneity bias’ 
  Second Stage 
(Outcome variable=Leave) 
First Stage 
(Outcome variable: HIGH) 
  Coefficient  z-value  Marginal 
Effect 
Coefficient  z-value  Marginal 
Effect 
Household income             
SELF  -0.167*  -1.65  -0.046  0.317***  2.99  0.106 
WAGE  0.242  0.84  0.063  0.086  0.28  0.028 
ALLOWANCE  -  -  -  0.285***  3.92  0.096 
             
Household and personal 
characteristics 
           
HIGH  2.324***  8.88  0.689  -  -  - 
GENDER  0.194  0.68  0.053  0.147  0.47  0.049 
HHSIZE  0.126  0.98  0.035  -0.105  -0.61  -0.035 
AGSIBLING  -0.470  -1.47  -0.114  0.457  1.40  0.163 
SCHOOLPAR  -0.692  -1.45  -0.228  -0.596  -1.11  -0.220 
         
Country Dummies  Yes  Yes 
Constant  0.772  0.75  -  -3.023***  -2.60  - 
      Log likelihood    -82.79 
Wald test  86.77 (0.00) 
- 
Wald test of rho equal to 0  301.86 (0.00) 
Observations  97 
*significant on 10%, **significant on 5% and *** significant on 1%. We reported robust standard errors. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
Agricultural employment in western countries has been steadily decreasing in the past 
decades, despite important levels of farm subsidies. Studies that have analyzed the impact of 
subsidies on agricultural employment arrived to contradictory conclusions, suggesting that their 
direct  positive  effect  on agricultural labor  supply  is  sometimes  counterbalanced  by  indirect Ancona - 122
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negative effects. In this paper we argue that that one such indirect effect, overlooked by the 
literature so far, is the impact of subsidies on farmers’ children’ education.  
The evolution of agricultural employment largely depends on the willingness of farmers’ 
children to overtake their parents’ activity. By increasing farmers’ revenues, subsidies allow 
them to increase investment in their children’s education. Children with higher education levels 
have access to better paid jobs in the industrial or services sectors. They are therefore less likely 
to be willing to work in the agricultural sector. We presented a theoretical model and empirical 
evidence supporting this argument.  
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